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ABSTRACT
Designing effective defense against adversarial attacks is
a crucial topic as deep neural networks have been prolifer-
ated rapidly in many security-critical domains such as mal-
ware detection and self-driving cars. Conventional defense
methods, although shown to be promising, are largely limited
by their single-source single-cost nature: The robustness pro-
motion tends to plateau when the defenses are made increas-
ingly stronger while the cost tends to amplify. In this paper,
we study principles of designing multi-source and multi-cost
schemes where defense performance is boosted from mul-
tiple defending components. Based on this motivation, we
propose a multi-source and multi-cost defense scheme, Ad-
versarially Trained Model Switching (AdvMS), that inherits
advantages from two leading schemes: adversarial training
and random model switching. We show that the multi-source
nature of AdvMS mitigates the performance plateauing issue
and the multi-cost nature enables improving robustness at a
flexible and adjustable combination of costs over different
factors which can better suit specific restrictions and needs
in practice.
Index Terms— Adversarial attack, adversarial robust-
ness, stochastic defense, adversarial training.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent studies on adversarial attacks [1] reveal a disquiet-
ing circumstance that well-trained deep neural nets with high
standard accuracy can be easily misled into making specific
wrong predictions chosen aforehand by the adversary through
crafting specific perturbations onto the inputs. The perturbed
input examples, called adversarial examples, usually can be
generated easily with gradient-based attacking methods, such
as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [2], Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) [3], Carlini Wagner (CW) attack [4, 5] and
Elastic-net Attack (EAD) [6]. Adversarial examples are also
shown to exist in the physical world [7, 8] and evasive even
when viewed at different perspectives and scales [9]. These
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phenomena prompt a great need of designing effective and
efficient defending schemes that insure robust and trustable
learning systems.
Unfortunately, despite a rich body of defending mecha-
nisms proposed recently in the literature [10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19], there is no cost-free defense that has
been discovered yet. Even if we assume additional costs in
the training phase are totally acceptable (as training can be
conducted off-line), the improved robustness using the above
methods is often achieved at a price, such as drop of test accu-
racy [10, 13], more memory consumption [15, 12, 20] or false
input rejection [16, 17] in the inference phase. In fact, the per-
formance of a defending scheme is usually correlated with its
cost, providing a trade-off between adversarial robustness and
other performance factors. For example, adversarial training
[10], which is considered one of the most popular defending
scheme in the literature, improves adversarial robustness of
deep neural nets by including adversarial examples (with cor-
rect labels) in the training phase. In this method, although one
can strengthen the defending effectiveness by using adversar-
ial examples with large distortions, it also leads to degraded
classification accuracy on natural images. In fact, although
the ultimate goal of defenders is to design effective defense
with negligible harms on other factors, some researchers also
point out the trade-off between adversarial robustness and its
cost factor (such as test accuracy) may be an inevitable nature
of deep neural nets [21, 22].
However, conventional single-source (that the robustness
stems from a single defending scheme) and single-cost (that
the robustness is traded with a single cost factor) defenses are
often unable to provide a desirable robustness-cost trade-off.
On the one hand, the defense improvement tends to exhaust as
cost increases, leading to a decreasing marginal improvement
of robustness. On the other hand, as robustness is traded with
a single cost factor, it often exceeds the tolerance range of that
factor in practice, making the defense invalid.
In this paper, we study the principles of designing multi-
source multi-cost defenses to break the above limitations.
We anticipate that an efficient complex defense can be made
with defense schemes with different source-cost pairs. Along
with this intuition, we propose Adversarially Trained Model
Switching (AdvMS) where a variety of sub-models adver-
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sarially trained from different initializations are grouped
together with a randomization scheme that assigns inputs
to one of the sub-model randomly in the inference time.
The selected sub-model is called to be activated which is
ever-switching. The proposed defense method leverages the
advantages of both adversarial training and stochastic defense
and has two defending sources: adversarially trained parame-
ters and stochasticity, and two cost factors: test accuracy and
memory consumption. Empirical results illustrate its boosted
defending performance and improved robustness-accuracy
and robustness-memory trade-offs compared with adversarial
training and model switching respectively. Moreover, the
proposed method allows a more flexible robustness-accuracy-
memory trade-off which is adjustable considering specific
system needs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: motivations
and details of the proposed approach is presented in Section
2. Experimental results and analysis are provided in Section
3, followed by Section 4 that concludes this work.
2. ADVERSARIALLY TRAINED MODEL
SWITCHING (ADVMS)
2.1. Motivation and Principles of Multi-source Multi-cost
Defense
We first explain the terms source and cost of a defense scheme
using adversarial training [3] as an example, as it is consid-
ered one of the most advanced one in the literature. Adver-
sarial training improves the worst-case robustness of a neural
network by incorporating adversarial examples in the train-
ing process. As a result, the adversarially trained weights
learn to adapt inputs with adversarial perturbations. We thus
term the weights of adversarially trained models the source
of the defense, as they are the surface of performing defense
efforts. The cost of adversarial training is the test accuracy
of the model on natural examples: the defense can be made
stronger by using larger adversarial perturbations for training,
at the cost of worse test accuracy on clean examples.
We call defense schemes in this fashion single-source
single-cost defenses, and most existing defenses fall into this
category. As they are implemented alone, the drawbacks are
obvious. Since there is only one scheme boosting robustness,
the benefit in robustness tends to plateau with increased de-
fense strength. Another issue is that the cost on a particular
factor can easily exceed the acceptable range, making the
defense strategy infeasible.
A natural solution to the above limitations is to design
multi-source multi-cost defense schemes. Although many
proposed defenses claim to be compatible with others, de-
signing complex defense is not trivial. We anticipate the
following principles of combining multiple defense compo-
nents as a complex defense. First, components need to have
different defense source. This ensures the defenses are not
intertwined which may cause degraded performance. Second,
components need to have different defense cost. This avoids
trading robustness with a single cost factor which leads to de-
creased marginal defense improvement, and at the same time
it allows a more flexible combination of costs over multiple
factors.
2.2. Using Multi-Source Multi-Cost Defense: AdvMS
Following the above guidelines, we propose a complex de-
fense AdvMS by merging adversarial training and switching-
based stochastic defense. The scheme of model switching
[12] protects the model by using a group of parallel sub-
models trained from different random initialization, where
the active one that processes model inputs is ever-switching
in the run time. It will not degrade test accuracy but increases
the memory consumption in the testing time. It thus has dif-
ferent source (stochasticity) and cost (memory consumption)
compared to adversarial training.
Implementing AdvMS with M sub-models contains 3
steps: step 1, randomly initialize the weights of M sub-
models of the same architecture and train them individually
with the same training settings (train), and training data;
step 2, save all M adversarially trained models and con-
struct a pool of parallel sub-models; step 3, add the stochastic
scheme that randomly activate one model from the pool in
each round of inference.
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES
3.1. Defense Against White-box and Adaptive Attacks
In this experiment, our proposed AdvMS is compared with its
building blocks: adversarial training [10] and random model
switching [15, 12]. The purpose of this experiment is to show
that the proposed complex defense outperforms each of its
defending component performed alone.
Table 1: Base Model Architectures for MNIST and CIFAR-
10.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Conv layer 32 × (3,3) 64 × (3,3)
Conv layer 32 × (3,3) 64 × (3,3)
Pooling layer pool size (2,2) pool size (2,2)
Conv layer 64 × (3,3) 128 × (3,3)
Conv layer 64 × (3,3) 128 × (3,3)
Pooling layer pool size (2,2) pool size (2,2)
Fully connected 1 200 units 256 units
Fully connected 2 200 units 256 units
Output layer 10 units 10 units
For a fair comparison, all defenses are implemented on
the same base model. Base model architectures for MNIST
and CIFAR-10 are summarized in Table 1. The defending
performance is measured by attack success rate (ASR) where
lower ASRs indicate stronger defense. We perform three
attacks: FGSM, PGD, and CW-PGD which are among the
strongest baselines in the literature. All attacks are conducted
in multiple strengths (controlled by the L∞ norm  of the
perturbation) and in both white-box setting, where we as-
sume attackers know all information of the target model,
and EOT (Expectation Over Transformation) [5, 20] which
is a counter-measure of attacks against randomized defense
schemes by using the expectation of stochastic gradients.
Fig.1 and Fig.2 summarize the defending performance on
CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets respectively.
FGSM PGD CW-PGDWhite-Box

Fig. 1: Attack success rate on CIFAR-10 dataset using
above:(White-Box) FGSM, PGD, and CW-PGD attacks, be-
low: FGSM + EOT, PGD + EOT, and CW-PGD + EOT at-
tacks
FGSM PGD CW-PGDWhite-Box

Fig. 2: Attack success rate on MNIST dataset using above:
(White-Box) FGSM, PGD, and CW-PGD attacks, below:
FGSM + EOT, PGD + EOT, and CW-PGD + EOT attacks.
As we can observe, the proposed AdvMS achieves supe-
Switch M = 2 Switch M = 3 Switch M = 4White-Box

Fig. 3: Attack success rate on CIFAR-10 dataset using differ-
ent (white-box or EOT) PGD attack settings with fixed num-
ber of models M in AdvMS
rior defense performance under all attack settings and per-
forms even better under stronger attacks such as PGD and
CW-PGD, where model switching and adversarial training are
less effective given the same level of attack strength.
3.2. Quantitative Analysis on Effects of Adversarial
Training and Model Switching in AdvMS
In this experiment, we perform a quantitative analysis by con-
trolling each of the two strength factors of AdvMS: , which
is the `∞ distortion of adversarial examples used in training,
andM which is the number of models for switching. This ex-
periment illustrates how enforcing one defending component
contributes to boost the performance on the top of the other.
In Fig.3, we fix the number of models in AdvMS and
compare the robustness performance obtained by changing
the train for adversarially trained models. In all cases we
can observe the trend that, AdvMS trained with larger train
value shows stronger resiliency to adversarial attacks in both
attack settings. However, it is also observed that although the
gap between no adversarial training and adversarial training
with train = 2/255 is large, the benefits gained by increas-
ing train tend to saturate with large train.
We further perform quantitative analysis on changing the
number of sub-models in AdvMS. Fig.4 exhibits our findings
that AdvMS with more adversarially trained models shows
more resistance against adversarial attacks. While the gain
in the defense rate when changing the deterministic model
(M = 1) to a stochastic model with M = 2 is sufficiently
large, the marginal gain in defense rate also tends to decease
when M is further increased.
These experiments illustrate the performance plateau is-
sue as discussed earlier, and verify the importance of using
Adv. Train eps = 2/255 Adv. Train eps = 4/255 Adv. Train eps = 6/255White-Box

Fig. 4: CIFAR-10 with fixed train PGD Attack. Attack
success rate on CIFAR-10 dataset using different (white-box
or EOT) PGD attack settings with fixed adversarial training
strength train in AdvMS
multi-source defenses to break this limitation of single-source
defenses.
3.3. Quantitative Analysis on Robustness-Accuracy and
Robustness-Memory Trade-offs of AdvMS
In Fig.5 (a) and Fig.5 (b), we plot defense effectiveness (quan-
tified by ASRs) against test accuracy of defense models given
by different combinations of Adversarial training strength 
and Number of Switching Models M in white-box and EOT
attack settings respectively. Here, points on the same curve
are given by AdvMS models with the same M and have the
same amount of memory consumption. Points using the same
marker type are given by AdvMS models with the same ad-
versarial training distortion  and have similar values of test
accuracy.
A defense scheme with ideal robustness-accuracy trade-
off will result in a curve approaching to the bottom-right
corner. As shown in Fig.5, when increase M , the curve
moves toward the bottom-right corner which indicates a bet-
ter robustness-accuracy trade-off. For example, AdvMS with
M = 5 can decrease ASR from 100% to around 25% with
less than 3% test accuracy drop while using adversarial train-
ing solely causes 15% drop in test accuracy to achieve the
same defense effect.
On the other hand, using large  dramatically reduces
the ASR, providing a better robustness-memory trade-off
of the defense. It is also clear that the slope of curves be-
come smaller on the left, which corresponds to the defense
effectiveness plateau issue as discussed previously.
(a) PGD
(b) PGD + EOT
Fig. 5: Robustness-Accuracy-Memory Trade-off on CIFAR-
10 dataset. (a) Set attack = 8/255 for PGD attack. (b) Set
attack = 8/255 for PGD attack + EOT (EOT: n=10).
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel multi-source multi-cost de-
fense method: Adversarially Trained Model Switching (Ad-
vMS) which can be implemented in the typical DNN model
training pipeline and inherits advantages from both adversar-
ial training and stochastic defense. Comparing to conven-
tional single-source single-cost defenses, it is advantaged in
preventing performance plateau issue and providing a more
flexible trade-off among robustness, test accuracy and mem-
ory consumption. Experimental results demonstrate that it
outperforms both adversarial training and model switching in
defending both write-box and adaptive (EOT) attacks and pro-
vides improved robustness-accuracy and robustness-memory
trade-offs compared with implementing the above two de-
fenses alone respectively.
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